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What ordinary means do we follow at the Conference to implement the
recommendation, the rationale, the philosophy which has just been articu-
lated by Father Whelan? For the last 35 years, that has been one of my
principal responsibilities: involvement in the administrative process.
Let us take a look at some of the principal sources of government
regulation. First, we have legislation requiring a definition of the legislative
term. A classic and irritating example is section 6033, requiring the filing
of Form 990 by all 501(c)(3) organizations, with certain exceptions. The
first exception is "churches." The Church community currently is not
inviting a definition of that term. The second exception is "integrated
auxiliaries of a Church," a brand new administrative animal, or legislative
animal, call it what you wish. And it has already resulted in a tremendous
amount of confusion as a result of the final regulation promulgated last
year.
Frequently we have ambiguous legislation requiring interpretation by
administrators. A classic example of that is the Unemployment Compen-
sation Act of 1976. Before 1976 there were certain exemptions, among them
elementary and secondary schools; they were exempt from coverage. The
Congress has deleted the terms "elementary and secondary schools." How-
ever, it left in the law several other basic exemptions, among them
churches and certain types of religious organizations. The Department of
Labor is still trying to determine whether that basic exemption relating to
churches still applies to parochial schools. We submitted a brief-you will
hear more about that tomorrow-a very substantial brief to the Solicitor
of the Labor Department, and later to the Secretary of the Department of
Labor, taking the position that parochial schools are components of the
Church and covered by the church exemption. That has not been resolved.
But it is one of the classic cases of ambiguous legislation requiring adminis-
trative interpretation.
Finally, you have ambiguous rulings requiring further administrative
interpretation. We had, for example, the one we discussed last year, Rev.
Rul. 76-323. That was not too ambiguous, it just knocked the religious out
of the box completely. Also, we have Rev. Rul. 77-290, which has a degree
of ambiguity, too. And it is pretty hard to determine precisely what it
means at this juncture. We know it restores 80% of the ground lost as a
result of Rev. Rul. 76-323, but it still is not satisfactory.
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Now, what do we really do with respect to these issues? As you know,
when there is a regulation contemplated by an administrative agency, it
first publishes a Notice of Rulemaking, a Proposed Regulation. Obviously,
we analyze that, and we submit written comments and follow it up with
an appearance at a public hearing. But, generally, the USCC procedure is
much more substantial than that. We start with the legislation. We work
very closely with our Office of Government Liaison. We try to get a law
and also develop legislative history, which will of necessity condition the
type of regulation which will ultimately be developed. This has been done
over and over again. For example, earlier today you heard about the limita-
tion on the audit of a church. That had its genesis in an intense legislative
battle. In 1969, the legislation that passed the House would have subjected
churches to audit. Ultimately, that was clarified in the legislation, and
then, after a series of conferences, we were able to impose on the Treasury
certain limitations with respect to audits of churches. We got the legisla-
tion, ultimately, and then we expanded it in the regulation. As I said, we
start first with the legislation and the legislative history. Then we know
that there has to be a definition of the term. There has to be a regulation.
So we concentrate on a series of contacts with the administrative officials.
We have developed a good relationship, a very substantial degree of credi-
bility with most of the administrative personnel.
Take, for example, the whole question of integrated auxiliaries of a
church. That legislation was passed in 1969. The first thing we did in 1970
was to delete definitions of the term "church" from section 170, which
would have been worse than the old 1956 regulation. It eliminated religious
orders from the definition of a church. We worked very extensively with
the Treasury, and the result was that we did get -a tentative definition of
the word "church," which, quite frankly, would have been most acceptable
and which would have taken care of most of the organizations which are
now subject to filing Form 990. But other religious organizations came in
and objected to any definition of the term "church," and so Treasury
decided not to define the term "church." Part of the history of the whole
question of integrated auxiliaries involved the failure of some Protestant
organizations to coordinate with us.
We had a series of conferences at the IRS level and, more particularly,
at the Treasury level, trying to get a definition of the term "integrated
auxiliary" which would be realistic. As a result of those contacts, we were
able to hold off a regulation for seven years. Also, we were able to delete
elementary and secondary schools from the ultimate regulation. Parochial
schools do not file precisely because of the conferences which we had with
IRS, and particularly with Treasury, emphasizing the relationship of pa-
rochial schools to our churches.
This, then, is the basic procedure. First is the legislation. Develop a
good legislative history. Second, recognize the term which must be defined.
Third, establish your contacts and credibility, and substantially in ad-
vance, arrange for conferences which will instruct and educate the admin-
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istrative agency with respect to the relationship of some of our institutions
to the Church, because that does not always carry over from the legislative
history. In most of these major regulations there have been a substantial
number of advance conferences. Then, when that is finished and it is time
for a Notice of Rulemaking, proceed to comment. That brings me to this
point. Should this organization adopt a different procedure, should we file
comments on a critical regulation for the Church, or should we just indi-
cate to the field that a Notice of Rulemaking is pending? And let the field,
as well as our organization, file comments? I still have not made up my
mind on that, because of an experience I had last year.
The Treasury came out with a good definition of the term "church
plan" for ERISA. As a matter of fact, they picked up Congressional lan-
guage which beautifully defined the term "church." It would be very help-
ful to us. It was language which was written back in 1956 and incorporated
in the Senate Finance Committee Report, and it was passed by the Con-
gress. One of the big church agencies elected to comment on this because
its organization was interested in this definition. They sent in written
comments, saying that the regulation was too sparse, that the regulation
did not give a sufficient amount of instruction, and that they should revise
the old "sacerdotal test," which knocked us out of the box in 1956. We had
to live with that for 20 years. That was the one which adversely affected
religious orders.
Fortunately, I learned about it the very day it was filed. I was able to
contact the attorney who had filed it, explained the situation to him, and
he withdrew it. He sent in a telegram withdrawing the comments. If we
do develop a system whereby the field comments, we are going to have to
have a clearance system so that we will not be working at odds with one
another. That is absolutely essential.
Now, what do we do if there is a ruling that comes out of the blue?
By the way, 76-323, the Rev. Rul. on the Vow of Poverty in 1976, came
completely out of the blue. I was told by IRS people that the Commissioner
pulled it off the back burner. There was no procedure, no Notice of Rule-
making (the IRS people do not have to have a Notice of Rulemaking on
these rulings, although sometimes when they are important they do). The
Revenue Procedure with respect to discrimination did have a Notice of
Rulemaking. So we had an opportunity to comment. These comments have
been very helpful.
What do we do when negotiations fail? I can assure you that there is
a very substantial degree of negotiation. First, we have to have a policy
consideration. If corrective action is needed, do we go into court
immediately? When negotiation has failed completely, then consideration
has to be given to legislation. In legislation you have an opportunity for a
certain amount of control. If it looks like it is going to get out of hand, you
can back off. Litigation is not recommended unless everything else fails.
Take the classic example, where you go into court and challenge a particu-
lar regulation which involves the definition, directly or indirectly, of the
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term "church." The federal court comes up with a real narrow definition
of the term "church" confining it exclusively to the church building itself,
with no other institutional implication. IRS and Treasury would latch on
to that immediately. They do not particularly desire to define the term
"church," a task with which they have had all kinds of difficulty, but they
could accept a narrow definition of a court. So we are concerned about
litigation in certain areas, because litigation can affect every one of you in
the room. So, when litigation is possible on one of these broad issues, we
feel that it should be submitted to our organization or submitted to the
group for considered action. But a final decision has to be made after
mature judgment concerning implications. Certainly, we know the poten-
tial for litigation is very, very pervasive. Now, on that point we have Joe
Fitzgerald, who is going to take up this question of litigation, because,
quite frankly, we are going to be confronted by it, we are already con-
fronted by it in the Supreme Court in one case, and I am sure we are going
to have many more in the near future.
